Dear, 천주교 의정부교구 We are making some adjustments to allow you to more conveniently view articles posted on the IFES Forum. You may now simply open your email from IFES and recently posted articles will appear directly on your screen: NORTH KOREA IN 2005: AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS JOINT NEW YEAR’S EDITORIAL by B. C. Koh IFES January 18, 2005 If you wish to view past articles or other information on our website you can still access the homepage at http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/ifes/ifes/eng/activity/05_ifes_forum.asp If you do not wish to receive these emails, please contact IFES at forum@mail.kyungnam.ac.kr In addition, if you would like to post an article, you may send it for review to Danton Ford at danton@kyungnam.ac.kr Sincerely, The Institute for Far Eastern Studies | |
For the eleventh consecutive year North Korea published a joint New Year’s editorial on January 1, 2005 in the daily organs of its three most influential organizations -- the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), the Korean People’s Army (KPA), and the Kim Il Sung Socialist League.(1) This practice began in the post-Kim Il Sung era, for until 2004 Kim Il Sung gave a speech on every New Year’s day reviewing the preceding year’s accomplishments and outlining the tasks for the new year. The 2005 joint editorial was entitled “Let the Whole Party and Army and All the People Unite as One in Mind and More Strikingly Demonstrate the Might of Songun [Military-First].”(2) Let us first note the main similarities and differences between this year’s editorial and last year’s.(3) First, the emphasis on songun is striking in both. Although the phrase did not appear in the title of last year’s joint editorial, as it did in this year’s, it was nonetheless the most frequently mentioned phrase in the 2004 editorial, with an astounding 40 references. This frequency is exactly duplicated this year; if its inclusion in the title is taken into account, however, this year’s editorial surpasses its predecessor by one. One may infer from the above that songun continues to serve as the pillar of the Kim Jong Il regime. That is to say, not only has the military emerged as the most powerful institution in North Korea but it also provides a role model for the entire populace. It is worth noting that of the three official posts Kim Jong Il occupies in the North, two pertain to the military -- the Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission and the Commander-in-Chief of the KPA. Additionally, he holds the rank of the Marshal of the KPA. Second, the obeisance to both Kim Jong Il and his late father, Kim Il Sung, continues unabated. North Korea under Kim Jong Il, in fact, features a dichotomy of reigning and ruling, as was true in the twilight years of the Kim Il Sung era. More than a decade after his biological demise, Kim Il Sung is symbolically alive -- as the constitutionally-anointed “eternal president” of the DPRK and the only person who is hailed as suryong [top leader] in the North. The honorific titles Kim Jong Il commands, as can be seen in this year’s joint editorial, include: kyongae hanun changgun nim [respected and beloved general], widaehan changgun nim [great general], widaehan yongdoja [great leader], and kyongae hanun ch’oego saryonggwan tongji [respected and beloved comrade supreme commander]. In a word, Kim Il Sung reins, while Kim Jong Il rules in the North. Third, this year’s editorial is no less upbeat than its predecessor, drawing a rosy picture of the preceding year’s achievements and setting ambitious targets for the new year, which marks the 60th anniversaries of both Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule and the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea. As for differences, the most notable is the absence of any reference to the nuclear issue. This contrasts with the 2004 editorial’s affirmation of Pyongyang’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the issue through “dialogue between the DPRK and the United States.” Last year, however, the North coupled the preceding commitment with a dire warning: it would respond with a “super hard line” to Washington’s hard line, which, in Pyongyang’s view, “completely rejects and threatens our dignified ideology and system.” What does this year’s join editorial cite as North Korea’s main accomplishments in 2004? In general terms, the North is said to have “opened the path to a breakthrough in building a powerful and prosperous nation [kangsong taeguk] by waging a revolutionary offensive on three fronts:” 1) politics and ideology, 2) anti-imperialism and military affairs, and 3) economy and science. Specifically, a “leap in production not seen in recent years” was made in electricity generation and railway transportation. Notable headway was also made in carrying out the “seeds revolution” and large-scale land-leveling and rezoning. On the “anti-imperialism and military affairs” front, the North Korean armed forces and people “resolutely smashed the U.S. imperialists’ vicious scheme to crush the DPRK to death, thereby demonstrating the might of songun.” This, according to the joint editorial, is “proof positive” that the North’s policy of “placing the highest priority on fortifying military capability under songun’s banner was justified tens of thousand times.” What does the North hope to accomplish in 2005 in order to commemorate the twin anniversaries? The top priority will be agriculture, for it is “the key to solving all the problems arising in economic construction and the people’s livelihood under the present conditions.” In order to increase agricultural production, the editorial urges that the “agricultural front” be provided with all the labor, equipment, and material it will need.” Improving seeds -- called the “seeds revolution” --, double cropping, potato and bean farming all merit special attention, it adds. Efforts must also continue in modernizing farming methods and increasing the rate of mechanization of farm work. The editorial also underlines the importance of making gains in the fields of electricity generation, coal production, railway transport, and light industry. It also calls for “sprucing up” the capital city of Pyongyang and for “building more dwelling units in the urban and rural areas alike.” In doing all this, both the Cabinet and the Workers’ Party will be most important. The role and function of the Cabinet are stressed anew. Noting that this year will mark the fifth anniversary of the “historic” inter-Korean summit and the publication of the June 15 joint declaration, the editorial reiterates the clarion call for North-South cooperation. “Cooperation for national independence, cooperation for peace and against war, and cooperation for reunification and patriotism” is the slogan all Koreans must uphold this year, it says. Since the “40-year colonial rule by Japan” has been succeeded by “60 years of forcible occupation by the U.S. forces” in the South, the editorial asserts, this adds up to a century of “domination by foreign powers,” an “intolerable national shame.” The editorial calls on all the Korean people to wage a fierce struggle to expel U.S. forces from the South and remove the “source of a nuclear war.” Only by doing so, it says, can the Korean people ensure peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.” How realistic are the goals enunciated by the joint editorial? If the North is serious about putting agriculture at the top of its domestic agenda, it is patently on the right track. Even if it were to carry out its professed intention to provide the agricultural sector with “all the labor, equipment, and material” that will be needed in order to make notable headway, however, the North will still fall short. It will require a massive infusion of aid; in addition to the humanitarian food aid it has been receiving from the international community since the mid-1990s, the North will need technical assistance and equipment from external sources. Whether such assistance will materialize will hinge on two closely related developments -- a marked improvement in inter-Korean relations and the resolution, or at least a measurable progress in the resolution, of the nuclear issue. Inter-Korean relations, which appeared to be evolving independently of the nuclear issue to some extent, however, have encountered a snag, as can be seen in the North’s abrupt cancellation of certain planned events in the Kaesong industrial park -- such as a planned on-site dedication ceremony of a South Korean-built hospital, a delay at North Korean request of South Korean delivery of 5.4 million coal briquettes to Kaesong residents, and a postponement of follow-up talks on construction of communications networks for South Korean companies operating in the industrial park.(4) As for the nuclear issue, the resumption of the stalled six-party talks will be prerequisite to its peaceful resolution. North Korea appears to be waiting for the crystallization of President George W. Bush’s second-term foreign policy or, at least, some indications of its contours. Now that his foreign policy team is in place, pending Senatorial confirmation, one may hazard the guess that Washington’s North Korea policy in the months ahead is unlikely to undergo radical change. The fear that Bush’s re-election may have signaled the ascendancy of “neo-cons” in his second-term foreign policy has all but dissipated. That said, one must note that Washington’s basic objective vis-a-vis the DPRK remains a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development program. Should the North fail to come to grips with this reality, no one can rule out the possibility that the crisis may take an ugly turn. An escalation of the crisis may entail the attempt by the United States and its allies to refer the case to the United Nations Security Council with the aim of securing passage of a resolution authorizing economic sanctions on the North. In the event that UNSC approval fails to materialize, the United States and its allies may try to impose sanctions outside the UN framework. Will the North make good its warning that it will equate sanctions with a declaration of war? Next on the ladder of escalation will be interdiction of vessels and aircraft originating from or going to North Korea, for which the proliferation security initiative (PSI) is already in place. This has a much higher probability than sanctions to provoke a forcible response from the North. The worst-case scenario of “surgical strikes” against nuclear installations in the North is too frightening to contemplate, for it is certain to trigger a second Korean War. What of the North’s appeal to nationalism (minjok chuui) and for North-South cooperation? If such cooperation is aimed at overriding cooperation between Seoul and Washington, however, it is exceedingly unlikely to occur. Notwithstanding its commitment to “independence” in foreign policy, the Roh Moo Hyun government will not be in a position to undermine, let alone jettison, the half-century-old ROK-U.S. alliance. In sum, North Korea’s hopes to make striking gains in agriculture, trumpet the virtues of North-South cooperation, and persuade the Roh government to opt for “independence” and peace in opposition to the U.S. may be wishful thinking at best. One hopes that cool heads will prevail in Pyongyang as well as in the capitals of its main adversaries and that 2005 will witness a leap forward in the resolution of the nuclear issue and the improvement of North Korea’s economy alike. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) In 1998 the joint editorial was published in the organs of the WPK and the KPA only. (2) “Chondang, Chongun, Chonmin i ilsim tangyol hayo songun ui wiryok ul to nop’i ttolch’ija,” Nodong sinmun [Labor News], Choson Inmingun [Korean People’s Army], Ch’ongnyon chonwi [Youth Vanguard], January 1, 2005, online at www.kcna.co.jp/2005-0101sasel.html and “Joint New Year Editorial,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) (Pyongyang), January 1, 2005, online at www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200501/news01/02.htm. Please note that the Romanization of Korean words in this article is based on the McCune-Reischauer system. Even though I have used the North Korean translation of the editorial’s title, I will be using my own translation in the remainder of this article. (3) For analysis of the 2004 joint New Year’s editorial, see B. C. Koh, “North Korea in 2003 and 2004: Pyongyang’s View,” IFES Forum, January 5, 2004, online at www.ifes.ac.kr. (4) Joo Sang-min, “[News Analysis] Inter-Korean Industrial Park Hits Unexpected Obstacle,” Korea Herald, January 14, 2005, online at www.koreaherald.co.kr. |
2005년 북한 신년 사설에 대한 평가(영문)
2005. 2. 23. 오후 2:03:01
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